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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PLEASURE BOAT TORTS IN ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION: SATISFYING THE MARITIME
NEXUS STANDARD
The traditional test of admiralty tort jurisdiction has been the
strict locality rule of The Plymouth.' That rule extended admiralty
jurisdiction to all torts occurring on the high seas or the navigable
waters of the United States.2 The Supreme Court modified this juris-
dictional test in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland3 by
adding the requirement that a tort in admiralty "bear a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity."' Although Executive
Jet involved an aviation tort occurring on navigable inland waters,'
admiralty courts have applied the rule to maritime torts generally.6
Since Executive Jet, several circuits have considered whether the
tortiQus activities of pleasure craft meet the new jurisdictional stan-
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
2 Id. at 35-36. Although the Supreme Court never ruled that locality was the sole
test of admiralty tort jurisdiction, lower federal courts applied the rule exclusively. See
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1972). See also
Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 61 (1914), where the question of the
exclusivity of the locality test was specifically left unresolved. Nevertheless, several
courts did recognize the absence of Supreme Court precedent on the issue. See, e.g.,
McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
409 U.S. 249 (1972).
Id. at 268.
Upon takeoff from Cleveland airport on a flight to Portland, Maine, and White
Plains, New York, a jet aircraft ingested seagulls into its engines, causing an almost
total loss of power. The aircraft crashed into the navigable waters of Lake Erie a short
distance from the end of the runway. Id. at 250. The Supreme Court denied the plane
owner's invocation of admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 274. See note 24 infra.
See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1976) (admiralty juris-
diction sustained upon applying the maritime relationship test to a claim that the
United States Coast Guard negligently failed to rescue the plaintiff's decedent); Cros-
son v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973) (maritime relationship test applied in an
action brought by a waterskier injured through the negligence of the boat operator,
admiralty jurisdiction found lacking); Rubin v. Power Auth. of New York, 356 F. Supp.
1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) (drowning deaths of two recreational divers swept into the
intake valves of defendant's generating plant held not within admiralty jurisdiction).
See also Bridwell & Whitten, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Outlook For the Doctrine
of Executive Jet, 1974 DuKE L.J. 757 [hereinafter cited as Bridwell & Whitten]; Note,
Admiralty Jurisdiction: Executive Jet in Historical Perspective 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 355
(1973).
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dard.7 The circuit courts have disagreed on the proper interpretation
of the new test with regard to pleasure boats8 because the Executive
Jet decision did not clearly establish the parameters of 'traditional
maritime activity.'9 While in the majority of admiralty cases the
relationship between tortious conduct and traditional maritime con-
cerns is clear,'0 the operation of pleasure craft on navigable waters
' Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974),
involved a ship-to-shore gun battle between deer poachers fleeing in a small boat and
the defenders of an island hunting preserve located in the Mississippi River. The pilot
of the pleasure craft was injured and sought to invoke admiralty jurisdiction in a suit
against the owner and the defenders of the hunting preserve. The Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the roles of the parties, the type of vehicles involved, the type of injury suffered,
and traditional concerns of admiralty law in sustaining admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at
525. See text accompanying note 82 infra.
In St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
884 (1974), the plaintiff was injured when thrown from a small boat negligently oper-
ated by one of the defendants. The accident occurred on a navigable portion of the
Arkansas River. The Eighth Circuit sustained admiralty jurisdiction on the ground
that a vessel operated on navigable waters satisfied the maritime nexus test.
See Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975), and text
accompanying note 14 infra. See also Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th
Cir. 1975), and text accompanying note 22 infra.
In Luna v. Star of India, 356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973), the court held that an
antique ship, permanently moored and used as a museum, was nonetheless a vessel;
the ship's location on navigable waters rendered it a proper subject of admiralty juris-
diction. Id. at 66.
' Compare Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.1975),
with St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
884 (1974). See text accompanying notes 58-59 infra.
I The Executive Jet opinion implies that traditional maritime activity is predomi-
nantly commercial in nature and that admiralty courts were created to deal with the
problems of the shipping industry. See 409 U.S. at 254-57. See also note 10 infra.
However, the opinion also mentions the navigation of vessels as a legitimate concern
of admiralty courts. Id. at 256. Since pleasure craft generally are considered vessels in
navigation, see St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974), Executive Jet offers some support for the contention that
pleasure boats must be considered within admiralty jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
Executive Jet does not require the conclusion that navigation alone is sufficient to
establish maritime nexus. See text accompanying notes 45-46 infra.
" One treatise states that:
It should be stressed that the important cases in admiralty are not the
borderline cases on jurisdiction; these may exercise a perverse fascina-
tion in the occasion they afford for elaborate casuistry, but the main
business of the [admiralty] court involves claims for cargo damage,
collision, seaman's injuries and the like-all well and comfortably
within the circle, and far from the penumbra.
G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 24 n.88 (1957), quoted in Executive
Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 254 (1972).
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presents a borderline situation." Although courts agree that the new
'locality plus"12 test does not necessarily exclude all pleasure craft
torts from admiralty jurisdiction,'3 the courts disagree over which
activities of pleasure boats are sufficiently related to traditional mari-
time concerns to justify the exercise of that jurisdiction.
The Fourth Circuit recently considered the problem of pleasure
boating within admiralty jurisdiction in Richards v. Blake Builders
Supply, Inc., 4 which joined two pleasure craft cases. The Virginia
case'" involved a claim against the manufacturer of a motorboat
which exploded causing a passenger's death. The accident occurred
on Lake Gaston, a man-made lake formed by two dams on the Roan-
oke River, and located partly in Virginia and partly in North Caro-
lina.'6 In the North Carolina case,' 7 a passenger was injured when a
boat veered off course and crashed into the bank of the Cape Fear
River.'8 Although the Fourth Circuit sustained admiralty jurisdiction
in each case,' 9 the Richards opinion urged the "relinquishment of
admiralty jurisdiction in controversies arising out of the operation of
small pleasure craft on inland lakes."2 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that the denial of jurisdiction was not possible within the
" See note 8 supra. As noted by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet, "it is the
perverse and casuistic borderline situations that have demonstrated some of the prob-
lems with the locality test of maritime tort jurisdiction." 409 U.S. at 255.
22 The test is usually described as the "locality plus maritime relationship test."
The phrase "locality plus maritime nexus" is also appropriate, and the terms are used
interchangeably.
'1 See note 7 supra. See also Kayfetz v. Walker, 404 F. Supp. 75 (D. Conn. 1975);
Banchi v. Miller, 388 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
" 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975).
's King v. Harris-Joyner Co., 384 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Va. 1974), rev'd sub nom.
Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975).
, The Fourth Circuit opinion did not make clear the extent of commercial activity
on Lake Gaston but stated that "[tlhere is nothing to suggest that Lake Gaston,
though navigable, supports any substantial commercial activity." 528 F.2d at 747. See
note 102 infra.
17 Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1975)
(district court case unreported).
"1 The vessel owner sought to limit his liability to the value of the vessel. The
Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 180-189 (1970) grants the right to restrict
damages in admiralty proceedings. See note 107 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 60-67 infra.
528 F.2d at 748. Only the Virginia case involved the operation of a pleasure boat
on an inland lake. See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra. Yet the Fourth Circuit
expressed disapproval of the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in both the Virginia and
North Carolina cases. Despite specific reference to pleasure boating on inland lakes,
the court's analysis is not confined to that class of pleasure boating torts.
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parameters of the locality plus test of Executive Jet.2' Thus, the
Fourth Circuit declined to interpret Executive Jet as overruling prior
precedent for the inclusion of pleasure craft in admiralty jurisdic-
tion .22
The Ninth Circuit, however, reached a different result in Adams
v. Montana Power Co., 23 a case factually similar to Richards. The
Adams suit was brought in admiralty to recover for the drowning
death of plaintiff's decedent which resulted when his small pleasure
boat was capsized by a discharge of water from the defendant's dam.
The accident occurred on a portion of the Missouri River completely
11 528 F.2d at 748
22 See note 8 supra. See also text accompanying note 76 infra. Despite the court's
conviction that the exercise of federal admiralty jurisdiction in Richards was inappro-
priate, the Fourth Circuit concluded:
we do not feel that we are free to read into the Supreme Court's
holding in Executive Jet Aviation a release from what seems to have
been the settled course of decision in the Supreme Court as well as in
the lower federal courts.
528 F.2d at 748. The 'settled course of decision' is that group of cases in which the
Supreme Court assumed that admiralty jurisdiction included the operation of pleasure
craft on navigable waters. See, e.g., Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953), and note
58 infra. In Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), passengers on a pleasure boat
brought an action against the estate of the deceased boat owner for injuries resulting
from carbon monoxide poisoning. The owner's estate sought to limit its liability pur-
suant to the Limitation of Liability Act, currently codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 183 et seq.
(1970). See note 107 infra. The Supreme Court in Just assumed without discussion that
admiralty jurisdiction was appropriate. In Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943),
petitioners sought to recover for the destruction of their pleasure vessels caused by the
explosion of gasoline fumes in the engine room of respondent's yacht. The Supreme
Court again assumed that admiralty jurisdiction was properly invoked. The Richards
court reasoned that Executive Jet, since it dealt with an aviation tort, could not be
interpreted to overrule the prior decisions granting admiralty jurisdiction in pleasure
boating cases. 528 F.2d at 749. The Fourth Circuit reconciled its decision in Crosson
v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973), with that in Richards by noting that the
Supreme Court had expressly disapproved a finding of admiralty jurisdiction in wat-
erskiing cases similar to Crosson; see Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
409 U.S. 249, 256 (1972), citing King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963)
(involving injury to waterskiers).
The Fourth Circuit decision in Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d
758 (4th Cir. 1973), is similarly distinguishable. That case involved a diving accident
on a lake where the defendant controlled the water-level. Admiralty jurisdiction was
denied on the ground that the Executive Jet decision specifically approved this result.
488 F.2d at 759-60. In Executive Jet the Supreme Court cited with approval Chapman
v. City of Grosse Point Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967) where admiralty jurisdiction
was denied over a tort claim resulting from a diving accident similar to that in Onley.
409 U.S. at 256.
- 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975).
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obstructed by two dams. While acknowledging the general applica-
bility of the locality plus maritime relationship test, the Ninth Cir-
cuit nevertheless denied admiralty jurisdiction and found that the
tort did not occur on navigable waters.
24
Both the Richards and Adams courts applied the modified juris-
dictional test of Executive Jet. Each court, however, emphasized a
different element of the two pronged inquiry. In Richards, the Fourth
Circuit's analysis primarily was directed toward resolution of the
maritime nexus issue,2 while in Adams the court's finding that the
tort occurred on non-navigable waters obviated the need to determine
maritime relationship. 2 Despite the difference in analytical empha-
sis, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits apparently agreed that both local-
ity on navigable waters and maritime relationship must be present
to satisfy the new jurisdictional standard.Y
21 Absent some statutory exception, admiralty jurisdiction prior to Executive Jet
extended only to torts occurring on navigable waters. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 20 (1866). See also note 98 infra, concerning the definition of navigable waters.
Despite a lack of clarity in Executive Jet with regard to the lQcality issue, locality on
navigable waters remains a component of the new jurisdictioal'test. Bridwell & Whit-
ten, supra note 6, at 761. Both parties in Executive Jet argued the locality issue to the
Supreme Court. The petitioners, owners of the aircraft, contended that the major
damage to the plane resulted from the fact that it sank in Lake Erie, and would not
have occurred had the plane crashed on land. Therefore, the tort occurred on navigable
waters. The respondents countered that the birds were ingested into the plane's en-
gines while the plane was above the runway, and therefore, the tort occurred on land.
409 U.S. at 266-67. The Court declined to resolve this question of where the tort
occurred, noting that "[tihese are hardly the types of distinctions with which admi-
ralty law was designed to deal." Id. at 267. Thus the Court treated maritime relation-
ship as the threshold issue and denied admiralty jurisdiction on that basis without
determining whether the tort had a maritime locality.
However, the Ninth Circuit in Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th
Cir. 1975), took a different approach. The court determined that the waterway on
which the tort occurred was not navigable and denied admiralty jurisdiction, noting
that its conclusion of non-navigability made consideration of maritime relationship
unnecessary. 528 F.2d at 441. The Adams court interpreted Executive Jet as requiring
both locality on navigable waters and maritime relationship to sustain admiralty juris-
diction. Since the court found one of the two essential elements lacking, admiralty
jurisdiction was denied. The significance of the Adams decision lies in the court's
definition of navigable waters. See text accompanying note 102 infra.
2 528 F.2d at 746. The locality issue as well as the maritime nexus issue was
argued on appeal. Brief for Appellants at 10, Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc.,
528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit did not specifically discuss the ques-
tions of locality and navigability but did rule that "[b]oth of these occurrences were
on navigable waters." Id. at 746.
2 528 F.2d at 441.
11 See note 24 supra. For a discussion of other possible interpretations of the
Executive Jet test see Bridwell & Whitten, supra note 6, at 772-86.
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While the Fourth and Ninth Circuits each stressed a different
aspect of the two part jurisdictional test, the courts agreed that com-
mercial activity is the cornerstone of admiralty jurisdiction.2 8 Both
courts noted that the historical purpose and justification for admi-
ralty jurisdiction was the promotion of commercial shipping. 9 Thus,
the courts reasoned that when no commercial interest is involved or
threatened by tortious activity, no reason exists for the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit emphasized commercial
activity in the context of determining the navigability of a waterway,
holding that waters presently devoid of commercial activity are not
navigable for purposes of invoking admiralty jurisdiction.30 Similarly,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that traditional maritime activity was
commercial in nature, and therefore, only tortious activity having a
sufficient relation to maritime commercial interests should be within
admiralty jurisdiction. 3' Despite consensus in Richards and Adams
on the relevance of commercial activity to admiralty jurisdictional
determinations, the two elements of the Executive Jet test, locality
on navigable waters and maritime relationship, remain distinct.32
Each element must be established to invoke federal admiralty juris-
diction under the doctrine of Executive Jet."
Although Executive Jet established maritime relationship as an
element of the new jurisdictional test, the locality requirement had
long been a prerequisite of admiralty tort jurisdiction. The locality
rule was stated in The Plymouth:3"
21 The Ninth Circuit in Adams discussed commercial activity, noting that
"[clommerce for the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction means activities related to the
business of shipping." 528 F.2d at 439. Although this definition appears to exclude
commercial fishing vessels from admiralty jurisdiction, the preceding sentence of the
court's opinion indicates that the exclusion was unintentional. The court there stated
that noncommercial sport fishing does not constitute commerce. Thus, by negative
implication, commercial fishing would constitute commerce for purposes of admiralty
jurisdiction. Id.
" See Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1975);
Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975).
528 F.2d at 441.
31 528 F.2d at 749.
31 See text accompanying note 30 supra. TheAdams court based its finding of non-
navigability on the absence of commercial activity on the portion of the Missouri River
where the tort occurred. 528 F.2d at 439. Since the river was completely obstructed by
two dams, it no longer formed a link in a commercial highway. Neither did it sustain
any local commercial traffic. Therefore, the portion of the river between the two dams
was non-navigable. Id. at 439-40.
See note 24 supra.
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866). The locality rule was first discussed in DeLovio v.
Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (C.C. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776). At the time of DeLouio, the
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Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board
a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of
admiralty cognizance. 5
In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court acknowledged the frequent
application of the locality rule" and added that "for the traditional
types of maritime torts, the traditional test has worked quite satisfac-
torily. 13 7 However, the Court also noted that the strict locality rule
presented problems in certain "perverse and casuistic borderline situ-
ations." To illustrate the "almost absurd" results produced by rigid
adherence to the rule, the Court cited cases in which admiralty juris-
diction was exercised over the claims of swimmers injured by floating
objects39 and waterskiers injured by towing motorboats." In these
cases the maritime locality of the tort was clear, yet the activity
lacked any connection with "traditional forms of maritime commerce
or navigation."'" While critical of the exercise of admiralty jurisdic-
concept of navigability was limited to "waters within the ebb and flow of the tide,"
Thomas v. Lane, 23 Fed. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C. Me. 1813) (No. 13,902). This formulation
of the rule was modified in 1851 in Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 233 (1851), eliminating the tidewater limitation. The Genessee Chief extended
admiralty jurisdiction to all waters of the United States navigable in interstate or
foreign commerce. Id. at 238. See text accompanying notes 102-09 infra.
I 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 36. The Plymouth specifically held that injury to land-based
persons or property caused by a vessel on navigable waters was not within admiralty
jurisdiction. However, this principal was overruled in 1948 by the Admiralty Extension
Act, Pub. L. No. 695, 62 Stat. 496 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970)), which
provides in part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
The Supreme Court referred to its opinion in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404
U.S. 202, 205 n.2 (1971), where the Court had cited over forty cases stating and apply-
ing the locality rule. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249,
254 (1972).
409 U.S. at 254.
31 Id. at 255. The Court also noted the disparate results reached in two factually
similar cases involving injury to longshoremen. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179
(1928), and Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935). The cases were
cited as examples of the problems presented by the strict locality rule. 409 U.S. at 255.
31 Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965) (claim
of a swimmer injured by a surfboard held within admiralty jurisdiction).
10 King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (injury to a waterskier
held within admiralty jurisdiction). The Executive Jet Court also implied that aviation
torts fell within this category of borderline jurisdictional problems. 409 U.S. at 261.
The Fourth Circuit decision in Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973) is based
on the Supreme Court's express disapproval of the King case. See note 22 supra.
1 409 U.S. at 255-56.
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tion in such situations, the Executive Jet Court attributed these in-
correct results to a strict reliance on locality as the sole test of admi-
ralty jurisdiction.2 The Court, therefore, required that, in addition
to locality on navigable waters, the tort bear a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity.
4 3
The Supreme Court, however, failed to define clearly the phrase
'traditional maritime activity.' Throughout the opinion, commerce
and navigation are mentioned conjunctively as elements of tradi-
tional maritime concern. 5 Yet, Executive Jet does not establish
whether both maritime commercial activity and navigation must be
present in order to satisfy the maritime nexus test or whether one of
those elements alone would be sufficient to demonstrate a traditional
maritime activity. The Court found only that the necessary relation-
ship does not exist in the context of aviation torts occurring during
intracontinental flight." The broad dictum of Executive Jet juxta-
posed with its narrow factual holding has resulted in uncertainty
regarding the scope of the locality plus test in borderline situations
42 Id. at 261.
13The Executive Jet Court concluded that the mere fact that a tort occurs on
navigable waters is not in itself sufficient to establish its maritime nature. "It is far
more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty to require also that the
wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." 409 U.S. at 268.
See Bridwell & Whitten, supra note 6, at 772-86, where other possible interpretations
of Executive Jet are discussed.
" The Court discussed the types of cases with which admiralty courts tradition-
ally deal, noting that:
The law of admiralty has evolved over many centuries, designed and
molded to handle problems of vessels relegated to ply the waterways
of the world, beyond whose shores they cannot go. That law deals with
navigational rules-rules that govern the manner and direction those
vessels may rightly move upon the waters. When a collision occurs or
a ship founders at sea, the law of admiralty looks to those rules to
determine fault, liability, and all other questions that may arise from
such a catastrophe. Through long experience, the law of the sea knows
how to determine whether a particular ship is seaworthy, and it knows
the nature of maintenance and cure. It is concerned with maritime
liens, the general average, captures and prizes, limitation of liability,
cargo damage, and claims for salvage.
409 U.S. at 269, 270. See Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Pleasure Craft Torts, 36
MD. L. REv. 212 (1976).
See, e.g., 409 U.S. at 256, 270.
Although the introductory portion of the Executive Jet opinion suggests that the
new test is applicable in all maritime tort cases, the holding of the case is narrowly
confined to the specific factual question. However, the lower courts have not inter-
preted the decision as confined to aviation torts. See notes 6 & 7 supra. But see
Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 384 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Md. 1973).
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involving the activities of pleasure craft."
Pleasure boats generally have been considered vessels in naviga-
tion"9 when operated on navigable waters.49 This characterization has
placed the activities of pleasure boaters within admiralty jurisdic-
tion 0 Nevertheless, pleasure craft do not fit comfortably within the
historical framework of admiralty.
The constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal
courts5' was intended to serve the needs of the commercial shipping
Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975).
St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
884 (1974). The term vessel is defined at 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
The word 'vessel' includes every description of water craft or other
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water.
The broad statutory definition, however, does not require the exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction over any particular type vessel. The jurisdictional test, locality plus mari-
time relationship, is not dependent on the statutory definition of a vessel. Although
the involvement of a vessel may serve as some evidence of maritime relationship, Kelly
v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974), the
function of the vessel more reliably indicates the strength of the relationship between
an occurrence and traditional maritime activity. But see Kayfetz v. Walker, 404 F.
Supp. 75 (D. Conn. 1975), where the court sustained admiralty jurisdiction of a claim
that arose from the collision of two sailboats taking part in a sporting event. However,
the function of pleasure sailboats is at best marginally related to the traditional con-
cerns of admiralty. See note 52 infra.
" See note 98 infra.
One court has suggested that the mere presence of a structure, technically
classified a vessel, on navigable waters is sufficient to sustain admiralty jurisdiction.
Luna v. Star of India, 356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (permanently moored vessel
used as museum). But see Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.
La. 1973), where a claim was brought by a workman injured while painting a deacti-
vated steamboat moored in navigable waters. The Jiles court denied admiralty juris-
diction on the grounds that the structure was not a vessel and the tort complained of
was not sufficiently related to traditional maritime activity. Id. at 1230-31.
11 The boundaries of federal amiralty jurisdiction are circumscribed by the consti-
tutional grant of jurisidction to the federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. I § 2. Congress
"cannot reach beyond the constitutional limits which are inherent in admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." E. JsRAD & A. SAN, 1 BENEDIcr ON ADMIRALTY 7-28, 7-29 (7th
ed. 1974). However, jurisdictional limits are difficult to define. The Supreme Court
described the constitutional boundaries of federal admiralty jurisdiction in Panama
R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924):
[Nevertheless] there are boundaries to the maritime law and
admiralty jurisdiction which inhere in those subjects and cannot be
altered by legislation, as by excluding a thing falling clearly within
them or including a thing falling clearly without.
The suggestion in the quoted passage that Congress may, within limits, alter the
scope of admiralty jurisdiction, might supply an alternative solution to the problem
of pleasure boating in admiralty. The Fourth Circuit suggested in Richards that Con-
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industry.2 The grant of jurisdiction established a single industry
commercial court applying uniform rules of law for the conduct of the
shipping business. 3 Uniformity and predictability of law are essential
to the protection of merchants involved in maritime trade and are
necessary to foster international trade. 4 In addition, regulation of
international shipping may relate to questions of foreign policy, re-
quiring the vesting of admiralty jurisdiction in the national govern-
ment.5 Considerations of international trade and foreign policy were
of great concern to the Framers of the Constitution."
Pleasure boating, however, did not exist on any significant scale
until long after the adoption of the Constitution. Thus, rules and
procedures of admiralty courts developed with reference to commer-
cial aspects of navigation and without regard to pleasure craft opera-
tions.5 7 Nevertheless, jurisdiction of claims arising from occurrences
on navigable waters traditionally has been exercised by admiralty
courts without reference to the type of vessel involved.,8 Under the
strict locality test, all torts occurring on navigable waters were cog-
gress restrict admiralty jurisdiction to exclude pleasure craft, 528 F.2d at 748, presum-
ably on the ground that pleasure craft do not fall clearly within that jurisdiction.
52 See Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 661,
670 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Stolz]. Professor Stolz concluded his discussion of the
historical purposes of admiralty jurisdiction:
Commerce and uniformity go together. There is virtue in having
the same rules applied to ships and their cargoes moving from port to
port: uniformity promotes the free movement of trade by increasing
the confidence of merchants in their ability to conduct business suc-
cessfully.
Id. at 671. See also Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.
1975).
" Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REv.
259, 260 (1950).
" The Ninth Circuit in Adams similarly defined the purpose of admiralty jurisdic-
tion as the creation of a uniform body of law to regulate the activities of the shipping
industry and to accommodate the interests of those engaged in the industry and those
who come in contact with it. Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d at 439 n.1.
1 Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1975). The
Richards court cited both Stolz, supra note 52, at 666-719, and G. GIMORE & C.
BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2nd ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & Black]
chapter 1, as authority for its discussion of the history of admiralty jurisdiction.
5' See Stolz, supra note 52, at 669-70.
, The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866); see note 51 supra.
s See, e.g., Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953). In Levinson, a passenger
on a small pleasure boat on the Ohio River was killed in a collision between that craft
and another pleasure boat. The question before the Court concerned the defective
appointment of an administrator, but the Court assumed, without discussion, that
admiralty jurisdiction was invoked properly.
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nizable in admiralty, whether involving merchant ships or pleasure
boats.59 The Executive Jet decision, however, requires a finding of
maritime relationship in every case, and circuit courts are uncertain
whether pleasure craft satisfy this requirement. Courts generally
have resolved this uncertainty by finding admiralty jurisdiction."0
The Fourth Circuit sustained admiralty jurisdiction in Richards"1
despite the court's opinion that the torts involved were essentially
local in character 2 and did not require the expertise of the admiralty
court.6 3 Noting that uniformity and predictability of law are the his-
torical justifications for admiralty jurisdiction, 4 the court reasoned
that pleasure craft torts ordinarily do not require such treatment. 5
The Fourth Circuit noted that most tortious activities of pleasure
craft are not essentially different from tort claims adjudicated in
state court and are of no greater interest to the federal government.6
Every state has developed well defined principles of tort law which
are an obvious, though not necessarily uniform,"7 body of law avail-
able as a substitute for admiralty principles. Thus, the denial of
admiralty jurisdiction in pleasure boating cases where the dispute is
primarily of local concern,"6 would result in state court application of
state law. 9 Nevertheless, the Richards court did conclude that admi-
5, See text accompanying note 35 supra.
'o See text accompanying note 6 supra.
, 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975).
62 The tortious activity involved in many pleasure craft cases is 'local' in the sense
that resolution of these controversies may not demand uniform national treatment. All
of the states have developed rules of tort law to govern controversies between their
citizens, and, absent some overriding federal interest in the outcome of such disputes,
the state courts and legislatures should be permitted to resolve them. Richards v.
Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 746-47 (4th Cir. 1975).
11 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Richards, state court systems "are as capable of
dealing with controversies arising out of a collision of two small motorboats as with
controversies arising out of the collision of two automobiles on an interstate highway."
Id. at 747, citing Stolz, supra note 52.
64 Id.
" Id. See note 62 supra.
" 528 F.2d 745, 746 (4th Cir. 1975).
67 In some states, for example, contributory negligence is a complete bar to a tort
recovery while other states and admiralty courts apply the doctrine of comparative
negligence. Compare, Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Gilliam, 211 Va. 542, 178 S.E.2d 499
(1971) (plaintiffs' recovery barred by contributory negligence) with Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975) (California doctrine of
contributory negligence overruled and comparative negligence standard adopted).
" See note 62 supra.
" The constitutional grant of federal admiralty jurisdiction, U.S. CONST., art. II
§ 2, was first implemented by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and is presently codified at 28
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ralty jurisdiction was appropriate in some pleasure boating cases
where oceangoing yachts and small craft are operated "sufficiently
far offshore to be without the jurisdiction of any state." 0 Since the
boating activity in such cases does not occur within the territorial
waters of any state, the activity is not of merely local concern and
federal admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate.
7'
In addition to tortious activity occurring outside state territorial
jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit recognized a federal interest in the
enforcement of uniform Rules of the Road. 72 When pleasure craft are
operated on commercially navigable waters, 73 the federal government
has a legitimate interest in requiring that they conform to the same
navigational and safety rules as commercial craft operating on the
same waters. 74 While uniform rules of navigation clearly are essential
for commercial craft and pleasure boats alike, the Richards court
noted that such rules can be interpreted and enforced by state courts
as well as federal judges.
75
Despite the Fourth Circuit's reluctance to sustain admiralty juris-
U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). That section grants the district courts exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil case of admiralty, "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which
they are otherwise entitled." This clause permits a claimant, in an in personam action,
to elect whether to prosecute his suit in admiralty or in a civil action in state or federal
court. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 55, at 37-40.
In cases currently brought in state court under the "saving to suitors" clause, 28
U.S.C. § 1333(1)(1970), the state courts must apply federal substantive law. Nonethe-
less, state courts may supplement the federal substantive law by applying state statu-
tory and decisional law, where such rules do not conflict with admiralty principles and
are not disruptive of the required uniformity of federal maritime law. Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
528 F.2d at 748.
' Id. In cases where the tort occurred on the high seas no forum other than the
federal courts can claim a legitimate interest in the resolution of the controversy.
" Id. at 747. The Rules of the Road are promulgated by Congress, see note 74 infra,
and cover such subjects as turning and maneuvering of vessels to avoid collision, safety
equipment requirements, and signal lights to be carried aboard vessels. GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 55, at 488-92. The Coast Guard has the power to supplement these
rules by the issuance of regulations. 33 U.S.C. §§ 157, 243 (1970).
7 See text accompanying notes 88-92 infra. The phrase commercially navigable
waters here refers to waterways presently supporting commercial traffic.
" The United States has four sets of navigational rules now in force. The Interna-
tional Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1094 (1970); The Great Lakes Rules, 33 U.S.C. 6§ 241-
295 (1970); The Western Rivers Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-356 (1970); The Inland Rules,
33 U.S.C. §§ 151-232 (1970). The areas of coverage of the four sets of rules are precisely
defined and charts furnish exact information as to where coverage areas begin and end.
Variations among the four sets of rules are minor. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 55, at
488-92.
11 528 F.2d at 747.
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diction in Richards, the court believed that it could not deviate from
the "settled course of decision in the Supreme Court as well as in the
lower federal courts. '7 Other circuits, however, have not shared the
Richards court's reluctance to reach similar results. 7 In Kelly v.
Smith, 8 the Fifth Circuit sustained admiralty jurisdiction over the
claims of plaintiffs injured in an exchange of rifle fire while fleeing a
Mississippi River island hunting preserve in their small pleasure
boat." The court applied the locality plus test of Executive Jet, but
discerned from that opinion and its own Fifth Circuit precedent" that
the sufficiency of a maritime relationship depends upon:
"the functions and roles of the parties; the types of vehicles
and instrumentalities involved; the causation and type of in-
jury; and traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law."'81
The court applied these criteria and found that the pilot of the boat,
who was responsible for its safe navigation, was the party injured; the
vehicle involved was a boat used for transportation on the river, a
traditional role of vessels; and the instrumentality of injury was a rifle
which is not so "inherently indigenous to land as to preclude any
maritime connection.""2 The Fifth Circuit also concluded that admi-
ralty traditionally had been concerned with furnishing remedies to
those injured while traveling navigable waters."' Thus, the court con-
cluded that, as a matter of policy, federal courts should exercise
jurisdiction over all tortious conduct that presents a potential danger
to maritime commerce.
8 4
The Kelly court did not indicate that the exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction was an undesirable result required by Executive Jet. Nor
did the court find any compelling state interest in the resolution of
the controversy, noting that "the federal interest in protecting navi-
gation on the Mississippi River overrides any considerations of
federal-state comity or conflicts of interest."" In contrast to the
' Id. at 748. See note 12 supra.
See notes 6 & 7 supra.
79 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973).
7 Id. at 521.
Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972)
(plaintiff injured in an automobile accident that occurred on a floating pontoon in the
Mississippi River used as a ferry boat dock; admiralty jurisdiction was denied). See





Id. The dissent disagreed with the majority on the question of state versus
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Richards decision, the Fifth Circuit was convinced of the need for
national uniformity of law in cases involving pleasure boats operated
on commercially navigable waterways. Since the tortious activity in
Kelly took place on the Mississippi River, the Fifth Circuit had no
difficulty in supporting a finding of locality on navigable waters. The
portion of the river on which the injury occurred was traveled regu-
larly by commercial craft,8 and the court concluded that a federal
interest exists in any activity which may affect interstate commerce."7
Other circuits have followed the rationale of the Kelly decision.
In St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson,8" the Eighth Circuit considered a
claim arising from the alleged negligence of a motor boat operator
resulting in injury to a passenger. The accident occurred on a naviga-
ble portion of the Arkansas River.89 The court reviewed post-
Executive Jet decisions which applied the maritime nexus standard
and concluded that "[tlhe use of a waterborne vessel on navigable
waters presents a case falling appropriately within the historical
scope and design of the law of admiralty.""° The opinion expressed
approval of the criteria established in Kelly,9 but did not specifically
apply those standards. Rather, the court assumed that non-
commercial navigation on navigable waters presents a potential dan-
ger "to the operation of vessels which are engaged in commerce on
those waters. 92 The opinion of the Eighth Circuit was not limited
strictly to the facts of the case, but concluded that all vessels, regard-
less of size and commercial or recreational character, meet the mari-
time relationship test when operated on navigable waters.93
federal interest. Id. at 527 (Morgan, J., dissenting). See note 87 infra.
" 485 F.2d at 525.
'7 Id. at 526. The dissenting opinion in Kelly, id. at 527 (Morgan, J., dissenting),
indicated that the majority's emphasis on potential danger to commerce on the Missis-
sippi River, created by tortious activity, obscured the facts of the case. There was no
evidence that commercial navigation was, in fact, endangered by the conduct of the
parties to the law suit. The focus of disagreement concerns whether the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction under the Kelly facts furthers the acknowledged federal interest
in protecting maritime commerce. The majority concluded that the potential threat
to commerce on the river justified the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. 485 F.2d at
526. The dissent, however, questioned both the existence of a potential threat, and the
majority's preference for a federal rather than a state remedy. Id. at 527-28 (Morgan,
J., dissenting).
496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
" 496 F.2d at 975.
'o Id. at 979.
" Id. at 978-79.
92 Id. at 979.
92 Id. The St. Hilaire Moye court, like the Kelly court was concerned with a
potential danger to commercial interests.
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The issue of navigability was treated as a threshold question by
the Ninth Circuit in Adams." Nevertheless, the Adams court indi-
rectly considered the relationship of pleasure craft with traditional
admiralty concerns as an essential element in determining whether
the locality of a tort is on navigable waters. The Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the pleasure boat tort had occurred on a non-navigable
portion of the Missouri River obstructed by two dams," and denied
admiralty jurisdiction." The court noted that the obstructed portion
of the river supported only sport fishing, pleasure boating and wat-
erskiing.5 7 While acknowledging the navigability of the Missouri
River for commerce clause purposes,98 the court distinguished the
purposes served by that clause and those served by admiralty juris-
diction.9 While the commerce power was designed, "to preserve and
protect the nation's waterways which, in their natural condition are
navigable in interstate commerce,"'' 0 the court concluded that the
definition of navigability in admiralty jurisdiction need not be the
same.'0' Thus, the Ninth Circuit didnot consider directly the applica-
bility of maritime relationship, but did determine in the context of
navigability, that admiralty jurisdiction should extend only to those
waterways which, in their present condition, either sustain or could
sustain commercial traffic.
0 2
The traditional admiralty rule for determining the navigability of
528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 439. The portion of the river on which the accident occurred is twenty five
miles long and is located between Hauser Dam and Holter Dam. Id.
"Id. at 441.
" The court concluded that "[n]either non-commercial fishing nor pleasure boat-
ing nor waterskiing constitutes commerce" in the admiralty context. Id. at 439. See
note 28 supra.
11 Congress has the power under the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl.
3, to regulate those waterways of the United States which are navigable in interstate
or foreign commerce. Any waterway that is used or susceptible of being used in its
ordinary condition as a highway of commerce, is navigable for commerce clause pur-
poses. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); note 103 infra. Subsequent
obstruction of a waterway once found to be navigable, does not alter that status.
Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 118 (1921). Further,
waterways may be found navigable under the commerce clause even if some artificial
improvements are required to render the waterway suitable for interstate traffic.
United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940). See also, Guinn,
An Analysis of Navigable Waters of the United States, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 559 (1966).
" 528 F.2d at 438-39.
'0 Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
,' Id. at 440-41.
,02 Id. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, the fact that a waterway in the past
had been declared navigable would not be controlling. See note 98 supra.
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a waterway had been a commerce clause distinction between naviga-
ble waters of the United States within federal admiralty jurisdiction
and state navigable waters over which the state courts exercised juris-
diction.'03 Commerce clause power and admiralty jurisdiction are no
longer co-extensive,0 4 and navigability for purposes of admiralty ju-
risdiction may be determined independently from commerce clause
considerations." 5 Thus, while a waterway once declared navigable
under the commerce clause remains navigable despite subsequent
obstruction,' 0 the admiralty definition of navigability could
eliminate admiralty tort jurisdiction on that waterway when an ob-
struction results in elimination of commercial traffic.' 7 Such a defini-
'3 See note 98 supra. The rule defining navigability was stated in The Daniel Ball:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways of commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And
they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the
meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the naviga-
ble waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway
over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or
foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is
conducted by water.
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1 (1891).
1G5 7A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE .200[3], at 2071-78 (2d ed. Supp. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as MooRE's].
101 See note 98 supra.
'* The navigability of the waterway on which the tort occurs also is the threshold
jurisdictional question in proceedings under the Limitation of Liability Act. 46 U.S.C.
§§ 183-189 (1970). This statute permits the owner of any vessel to limit his liability
for any injury, damage, or loss "occasioned or incurred, without the privity or knowl-
edge of such owner or owners. . .[to] the value of the interest of such owner in such
vessel, and her freight then pending." 46 U.S.C. § 183(a)(1970). The act was passed
in 1851 to insure that the American shipping industry would not be at a competitive
disadvantage with foreign shipping interests. 7A MOORE'S, supra note 105, .215[5]
at 2401-09 (2nd ed. 1976); Petition of Reading, 169 F. Supp. 165, 167 (N.D.N.Y. 1958),
afl'd, 271 F.2d 959 (2nd Cir. 1959). Since commercial navigation on inland waterways
was minimal when the statute was first enacted, the original provisions applied only
to oceangoing vessels and specifically excluded "any vessel of any description what-
soever, used in rivers or inland navigation." Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43,§ 7, 9 Stat.
635. However, when the volume of inland commercial shipping increased the act was
amended to "apply to all seagoing vessels, and also to all vessels used on lakes or rivers
or in inland navigation . . . ." Act of June 19, 1886, ch. 421, § 4, 24 Stat. 80.
Since the original purpose and sole justification of the Limitation of Liability Act
was the protection of commercial interests, granting the right of limitation to pleasure
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tion of navigable waters for admiralty purposes is consistent with the
boat owners seems incongruous. Nevertheless, courts generally have construed the
term "vessel" broadly to include pleasure as well as commercial craft. See, e.g., Feige
v. Hurley, 89 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1937). Numerous cases have allowed pleasure boat
owners to limit their liability, provided however, that the occurrence is without the
privity or knowledge of the owner. See, e.g., Gibboney v. Wright, 517 F.2d 1054 (5th
Cir. 1975) (owner of a thirty foot sailboat was permitted to limit his liability for injury
to passengers which occurred without his privity or knowledge); Application of Thei-
sen, 349 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (court acknowledged the applicability of the
statute to pleasure craft, but refused to allow limitation on the ground that the tort
was within the privity or knowledge of the boat ovner); Petition of Porter, 272 F. Supp.
282 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (court acknowledged the applicability of the limitation statute
to small pleasure boats). See also, Harolds, Limitation of Liability And Its Application
to Pleasure Boats, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 423 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Harolds]. An owner
who operates his own pleasure boat cannot claim- lack of privity or knowledge and is
not entitled to limitation. Professors Gilmore and Black have noted that
[n]o theory can justify the results reached in Coryell v. Phipps
[and other cases], under which the owner of a yacht or speedboat,
who is provident enough to hire someone else to run the boat for him
is granted a general license to kill and destroy.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 55, at 882. Such criticism of application of the act to
pleasure boats is now commonplace. See, e.g., Harolds,supra, at 430; 7A MooRE'S,
supra note 105, .215[5] at 2408; Stolz, supra note 52, at 709; Note, Shipowner's
Limited Liability, 3 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. 105 (1967). Commentators empha-
size that the act's purpose of fostering commercial shipping is not promoted by allow-
ing pleasure boat owners to limit liability; nor does limitation allow adequate compen-
sation to those injured by the tortious conduct of pleasure boaters. Thus, many com-
mentators have urged repeal of the act or, absent Congressional action, a narrow
construction of the term "vessel" to exclude pleasure craft. See GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 55, at 882-83; 7A MooR.'s, supra note 105, .215[5] at 2408-09; Stolz,
supra note 52, at 661.
However, even as the term vessel is presently construed, not all pleasure boat
owners are entitled to limitation. The owner seeking to limit liability must establish
that the jurisdiction of the admiralty court was properly invoked. Thus, in tort claims
the owner must establish that the situs of the tort was on navigable waters. GILMORE
& BLACK, supra note 55, at 877-83.Under a broad definition of navigability such as that
of The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870), see note 103 supra, limitation may
be granted to those pleasure boat owners whose craft are operated on completely
obstructed waterways supporting no commercial activity. Application of the Adams
navigability test, however, would exclude noncommercial waterways from admiralty
jurisdiction and deny a right of limitation to the owners of pleasure craft operated on
non-commercial waters. This approach was followed in George v. Beavark, 402 F.2d
977 (8th Cir. 1968). In that case, owners of a thirty-eight foot pleasure boat sought to
limit their liability for damage to other pleasure boats and a boat dock which resulted
from a fire on board their boat. At the time of the fire, the boat was moored on Beaver
Lake, a manmade lake in Northwest Arkansas formed by a dam on the White River.
The court denied the petition for limitation on the grounds that Beaver Lake was non-
navigable and therefore, the admiralty court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 981. See also
Petition of Madsen, 187 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
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Executive Jet mandate to consider the traditional concerns of mari-
time law.'18
The Adams and Richards courts agree that traditional concerns
of admiralty are commercial shipping and navigation of commercial
craft on the nation's waterways. These decisions imply that when
commercial activity,' 9 trade and transportation, are absent, the fed-
eral government ceases to have an overriding interest in the activity
for purposes of admiralty law uniformity."10 Rather, the state's inter-
est in providing a forum for resolution of legal disputes within its
borders becomes predominant."' This lack of federal interest
prompted the Adams court to exclude a pleasure boating tort from
admiralty by relating the admiralty definition of navigability to the
historical purposes of that jurisdiction.
Although application of the Adams navigability test might have
changed the result in the Virginia case decided in Richards,"' the
redefinition of navigability to exclude non-commercial waters from
admiralty does not solve entirely the problem of pleasure boating
within admiralty jurisdiction. Many pleasure craft torts occur on
waterways supporting commercial traffic. In such situations, the
maritime relationship test must determine whether admiralty juris-
"' Waterways that support no commercial activity are non-navigable in admi-
ralty, Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975), and no tort
occurring on non-commercial waterways could be sufficiently related to traditional
maritime activity to justify admiralty jurisdiction. Richards v. Blake Builders Supply,
Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975). When the tort occurs on commercially navigable
waters, however, the question of maritime relationship remains. If the particular oc-
currence itself involved some relationship to commercial activity, then admiralty juris-
diction is appropriate. See Stolz, supra note 52, at 671. If the occurrence did not involve
any commercial interest, either directly or by way of an actual threat, and the claim
arose within a state's territorial jurisdiction, then admiralty jurisdiction need not be
exercised.
"o See note 28 supra. See also Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 526 (Morgan, J.,
dissenting 1973).
,,0 Professor Stolz expressed his objection to pleasure boating in admiralty:
The chief objection to the application of admiralty law to pleasure
boating is that it implicitly prohibits the exercise of state legislative
power in an area in which the local legislatures have generally been
thought competent and in which Congress cannot be expected either
to be interested or to be responsive to local needs.
Stolz, supra note 52, at 664.
See Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1975).
,,2 See notes 15 & 16 supra. If Lake Gaston, the situs of the tort in the Virginia
case, was not used for the transportation of goods or passengers, then the Richards
court could have adopted a definition of navigability similar to that in Adams. The
Cape Fear River, involved in the North Carolina case, apparently sustained some
commercial traffic. 528 F.2d at 747.
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diction should be exercised.' 3 Most circuit courts, upon looking for a
maritime relationship in pleasure boating, have interpreted tradi-
tional maritime activity to include all occurrences involving the navi-
gation of vessels."' This definition, however, does not adequately
consider the history and function of admiralty courts"5 in exercising
jurisdiction over maritime shipping and commercial trade.", Addi-
tionally, the courts have minimized the often predominant state in-
terests in legislative and judicial solution of the problems of pleasure
boating."7
As the Richards opinion suggests, the Supreme Court has not
overruled earlier precedents for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction
over pleasure craft torts."' Rather, the Court's decision in Executive
Jet has modified the strict locality test which permitted the exercise
of admiralty jurisdiction in previous pleasure boating cases. The
Supreme Court implied in Executive Jet that admiralty law was
designed to serve an essentially commercial purpose: to provide a
specialized body of law to resolve the disputes of those engaged in the
business of commerce by water.I" While all tortious activity of vessels
on navigable waters initially presents a jurisdictional question, those
cases having no connection with the historical function of admiralty
should be excluded. In situations arising on non-commercial water-
ways, the requirement of locality on navigable waters, as defined for
admiralty purposes, will eliminate the torts of pleasure craft from
admiralty jurisdiction.'20 Those pleasure craft torts occurring on com-
11 The Fourth Circuit in Richards suggested:
Perhaps what is needed is congressional attention to the matter, for
the Congress, after hearings, could tailor the jurisdiction to the need,
relinquishing to the states and their judicial systems those controver-
sies better handled there while retaining for federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion those controversies for which it is better equipped.
528 F.2d at 748 (footnote omitted).
"I Only Richards and Adams have suggested that "traditional maritime activity"
should be interpreted more narrowly. The Fifth Circuit in Kelly implied that when
the instrumentality involved in a tortious event was a vessel the maritime relationship
was sufficient. 485 F.2d at 525-26.
"5 See, e.g., St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 979 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 884 (1974).
"' See, e.g., Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
969 (1974); St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 979 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 884 (1974).
"7 See notes 62 & 110 supra.
11 Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1975).
"' 409 U.S. at 270. See note 9 supra.
' Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975).
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mercially navigable waters must be considered in light of the histori-
cal design of admiralty jurisdiction to determine whether the exercise
of jurisdiction furthers the commercial interests which admiralty
courts were created to serve. A pragmatic insistence on the existence
of a relationship between tortious conduct and the historical purposes
of admiralty law will allow realistic solutions to borderline jurisdic-
tional problems.
MARY KAY DEPoY
